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INTRODUCfORY REMARKS 
WILLIAM MICHAEL TREANOR .:r 
THIS issue of the Fordham Law Review presents Fordham Law 
1L School's tribute to one of the giants of American law and American 
history on the occasion of his retirement from the Supreme Court. Jus-
tice Thurgood Marshall is, I believe, the single most important lawyer of 
this century, both for his contribution as an advocate and for his contri-
bution as a jurist. Because he decided to make the law his career and 
because of the way in which he pursued that career, the United States 
today is a remarkably different place than it was in 1933 when he began 
practice, and ours is a far more just society. 
Justice Marshall made history repeatedly-as Chief Counsel of the 
NAACP Legal Defense Fund, as Judge of the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit, as Solicitor General, and, of course, as 
Supreme Court Justice. But perhaps his most important contribution 
was his victory in the case of Brown v. Board of Education. 1 
On March 24, 1992, Fordham Law School and the Stein Institute of 
Law and Ethics paid tribute to Justice Marshall by hosting a program 
exploring the significance of this case. That program, entitled "Brown v. 
Board of Education and its Legacy," brought together a remarkable 
group of leading jurists, scholars, and civil rights litigators to discuss the 
significance of Brown and the past and future of civil rights in this coun-
try. The presentations of the panelists (revised for publication) are gath-
ered here. 
Brown was the capstone of Justice Marshall's campaign at the 
NAACP Legal Defense Fund to combat and eradicate state-sponsored 
segregation. There were, of course, two Supreme Court decisions in 
Brown. In the first decision, in 1954, Chief Justice Warren, on behalf of a 
unanimous Court, ruled that "[s]eparate educational facilities are inher-
ently unequal."2 While it established the constitutional right to equal 
education in bold terms, the first decision, commonly referred to as 
Brown I, left open the question of what was the remedy for the violation 
of that right. The following year, in Brown II, the Court fashioned a 
remedy that left the right largely unrealized; rejecting Marshall's request 
to fix a date for the end to segregation, 3 it unanimously directed the dis-
trict courts "to admit [the parties] to public schools on a racially nondis-
* Associate Professor of Law, Fordham University. I would like to thank Russell 
Pearce for his comments on an earlier draft of this introduction and Mary Daly and 
Bruce Green, my co-organizers, for "Brown v. Board of Education and its Legacy: A 
Tribute to Justice Marshall," for their help in putting this symposium together. I would 
also like to thank Fordham Law School and the Stein Institute of Law and Ethics for 
their generous sponsorship of this program. 
1. 349 U.S. 294 (1955) (Brown II); 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (Brown/). 
2. Brown I, 347 U.S. at 495. 
3. See Richard Kluger, Simple Justice 941 (1975). 
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criminatory basis with all deliberate speed."4 
Together, the decisions in Brown were, at the same time, both revolu-
tionary and conservative. They were revolutionary because they dramat-
ically changed the law and the life of the people in this country;5 yet, they 
were conservative because that change was effected by the actions of law-
fully constituted authority. The decisions were controversial at the time, 
and their jurisprudential underpinnings remain controversial today. 
Perhaps the most famous critique of the jurisprudence of Brown is Pro-
fessor Herbert Wechsler's 1959 essay Toward Neutral Principles of Law, 
in which he contended that the decision was unprincipled and contrary 
to basic tenets of constitutional govemment.6 More recently, Professor 
Charles Lawrence and others have said that the Court in Brown I missed 
the real wrong. By focusing on the psychological harms of segregation, 
the Court missed the fact that the real harm of segregation is that it 
stigmatizes and subordinates African-Americans. It has additionally 
been argued that because the Court got the right wrong in Brown I, the 
Supreme Court in the 1970s and 1980s was able to retreat from its com-
mitment to civil rights. 7 
Just as the right has been attacked, so has the remedy. The limited 
remedy of Brown //-and in particular the "all deliberate speed" formu-
lation-did not promptly vindicate the rights of African-Americans. In 
fact, ten years after Brown, only two percent of Black children in the 
South attended desegregated schools. 8 
These two themes, the transformation that Brown created and the lim-
its of that transformation, are the focus of the first panel of the tribute, 
"Brown and the Transformation of the Constitution." 
The first contribution is from one of the legends of the civil rights 
movement, Judge Constance Baker Motley. ~udge Motley participated 
in all of the major education cases during her two decades with the Legal 
Defense Fund, including both Brown I and Brown II, in which she was 
one of the attorneys who wrote the briefs that the Legal Defense Fund 
submitted to the Supreme Court. Speaking from the vantage point of a 
participant, Judge Motley places Brown in the context of the earlier civil 
rights cases that eroded the force of Plessy v. Ferguson,9 and assesses the 
impact of the Brown decision. In the second piece, Professor Mark 
4. Brown II, 349 U.S. at 301. 
5. For discussions of the way in which Brown transformed the civil rights move-
ment, see Kluger, supra note 3, at 946-60; Gene B. Sperling, Does the Supreme Court 
Matter?, Am. Prospect, Winter 1991, at 91-92. 
6. See Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 13 Harv. 
L. Rev. 1, 31-35 (1959). 
7. See Charles Lawrence, "One More River to Cross"- Recognizing the Rea/Injury 
in Brown: A Prerequisite to Shaping New Remedies, in Shades of Brown: New Perspec-
tives on School Desegregation 49 (Derrick A. Bell ed., 1980). 
8. See Cass R. Sunstein, Constitutional Politics and the Conservative Court, Am. 
Prospect, Apr. 1990, at 51, 59. 
9. 163 U.S. 537 (1896), overruled by Brown v. Board ofEduc., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
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Tushnet, speaking from the vantage point of historian and legal scholar, 
probes the gap between Brown rs right and Brown Irs remedy, and con-
cludes that the "all deliberate speed" formulation ultimately, and ironi-
cally, contributed to the rise of judicial activism and modern public law 
litigation. The final member of the panel is Judge Louis Pollak, a long-
time advisor to the NAACP Legal Defense Fund, one of the attorneys 
who wrote the brief in Brown II, and author of the article, Racial Dis-
crimination and Judicial Integrity: A Reply to Professor Wechsler. 10 
Although then-Professor Pollak disagreed with the Court's reasoning, 
that article provided one of the most important defenses of the constitu-
tional legitimacy of the holding in Brown. In his contribution here, 
Judge Pollak discusses the generative power of Brown's commitment to 
the principle of equality, a power that he sees manifested in the Supreme 
Court's jurisprudence of the next quarter-century, and even in the juris-
prudence of foreign countries. 
The second panel, "Civil Rights in Education after Brown," focuses on 
a specific aspect of Brown's legacy: the on-going campaign to end school 
segregation. The members of the panel are four attorneys who played an 
important and distinguished role in litigating post-Brown civil rights 
cases. Each writer's discussion focuses on one or two of the education 
cases on which he worked and the lessons that can be drawn from those 
experiences. 
The cases that are the subject of this second panel are, for the most 
part, a second generation of segregation cases-second generation not 
merely in terms of chronology, but also second generation in terms of the 
type of case. The focus is no longer primarily, as it was in the years 
immediately following Brown, on the South, although it remains in the 
South as well. These are cases in which educational segregation is inex-
tricably linked to segregation in housing, and in which segregation in 
housing is a product of White flight as much as it is a product of segrega-
tion within the town or the city. 
The problems posed by these cases are more complex, but the underly-
ing issues remain largely the same as they were in Brown. What is the 
nature of the constitutional rights involved? What kind of remedy is ap-
propriate for those rights? What is the relationship between the rights 
articulated by courts and the remedies that they require to be followed? 
What is the relation between judicial enunciation of rights and remedies 
and popular support for civil rights? To these questions, however, a new 
one is added: Does the more complex nature of the segregation involved 
necessitate a different kind of remedy? 
The first panelist, Mr. Conrad Harper, a member of the NAACP 
Legal Defense and Educational Fund's staff from 1965 to 1970, discusses 
Harkless v. Sweeny Independent School District, 11 a case which played an 
10. 108 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1 (1959). 
11. 427 F.2d 319 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 991 (1971). 
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important role in the eventually successful challenge to Monroe v. 
Pape's12 bar to civil rights suits against municipalities. Mr. Harper ar-
gues that the case illustrates how the Legal Defense Fund successfully 
combated hostile precedent. Professor Drew Days, a former Assistant 
Attorney General for Civil Rights and First Assistant Counsel for the 
NAACP Legal Defense Fund, offers the Hillsborough County, Florida 
school desegregation case13 as an example of how integregation can be 
successfully achieved. In a dramatically different tone, Judge Nathaniel 
Jones, NAACP General Counsel for a decade, discusses Milliken v. 
Brad/ey. 14 Milliken was the critical case in the attempt to apply the prin-
ciples enunciated in Brown to Northern schools, and, Judge Jones elo-
quently declares, the Supreme Court's decision in Milliken I was a 
"watershed" event in the retreat from the Court's commitment to racial 
equality. The final panelist whose comments are presented here is Pro-
fessor Theodore Shaw. Professor Shaw was a trial attorney in the Civil 
Rights Division of the Department of Justice, Assistant Counsel and Di-
rector of the Education Docket for the NAACP's Legal Defense Fund, 
and Western Regional Counsel for the Legal Defense Fund. He dis-
cusses Missouri v. Jenkins 15 and Dowell v. Board of Education. 16 Profes-
sor Shaw uses these cases as evidence of the complexity of the school 
desegregation issue, of the difficulties that those who hope to carry on in 
the tradition of Justice Marshall must confront, and of the importance of 
carrying on that tradition. 
The closing remarks come from the program's moderator, Mr. Paul 
Dimond, a distinguished scholar and former Director of the National 
Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights under Law. Mr. Dimond suggests 
that an "anticaste" principle informs the Supreme Court's decision in 
Brown and argues for its revival. Returning to the theme of the differ-
ence between the right and the remedy in Brown, Mr. Dimond defends 
the appropriateness of separating right and remedy. He argues that the 
combination of the enunciation of broad constitutional principles and the 
use of constrained judicial remedies acknowledges limitations on judicial 
power while permitting coalition building. 
Taken together, the two panels illustrate the many dimensions of 
Brown's legacy. The panelists' comments demonstrate that the promise 
of Brown remains and may well long remain unfulfilled. But the weight 
of their remarks is to mark and celebrate a triumph. The comments 
show the way in which the decision's support for the principle of racial 
equality empowered the civil rights movement and shaped subsequent 
12. 365 U.S. 167 (1961), overruled by Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 
658 (1978), and overruled by Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977). 
13. See Mannings v. Board of Pub. Instruction, 306 F. Supp. 497 (M.D. Fla. 1969), 
rev'd, 427 F.2d 874 (5th Cir. 1970). 
14. 433 U.S. 267 (1977) (Milliken II); 418 U.S. 717 (1974) (Milliken/). 
15. 495 u.s. 33 (1990). 
16. 396 u.s. 269 (1969). 
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constitutional and legal developments on a host of fronts, and they show 
how Brown set an aspirational standard against which subsequent devel-
opments would be tested. 
Strikingly, the remarks of the panelists also bear witness to the incom-
parable significance of the career of Justice Thurgood Marshall. The 
panelists discuss Justice Marshall in many different contexts. They speak 
of him as a colleague, as a Supreme Court Justice, as a hero. Regardless 
of how they know him, the common thread is that he touched their lives. 
Although in different ways, each of the panelists has been a fighter for 
the cause of racial justice and equality. In that struggle, each of the pan-
elists was clearly inspired and challenged by Thurgood Marshall. It is 
this ability to challenge and inspire countless men and women-just as 
much as it is his role in personally shaping the law-that constitutes 
Thurgood Marshall's legacy. 
